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Professor Miller concludes that “law and lawyers have something
useful to contribute to the growing debate about nuclear war.” I agree
that lawyers can make a useful contribution. Whether the law can
make a contribution is quite another matter, on which I have serious
doubts.
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Professor Miller concludes that "law and lawyers have something
useful to contribute to the growing debate about nuclear war." I agree
that lawyers can make a useful contribution. Whether the law can
make a contribution is quite another matter, on which I have serious
doubts.
In order to evaluate the contribution that the law can make, let us
assume .that Miller has convincingly demonstrated that the United
States Constitution prohibits the manufacture, deployment and use of
nuclear weapons. Let us also assume that, in order to resolve any lin-
gering doubts, the people of the United States have added a new
amendment to the Constitution, worded as follows:
1. It is the policy of the United States that the public or private
production, ownership, deployment, use or threatened use of nu-
clear weapons, whether inside or outside the United States, violates
basic human rights in the United States and throughout the world.
2. The Congress, the President and all other officers of the United
States shall take all actions that are feasible to implement this
amendment.
What could be the effect of this constitutional message upon the con-
duct of national and international affairs?
Clearly this constitutional amendment would not oblige the United
States to disarm unilaterally while other countries continue to stockpile
and deploy nuclear weapons. Even if the amendment, when read in iso-
lation, could be interpreted as a mandate for unilateral disarmament, it
would have to be read in context of the government's basic responsibil-
ity to preserve and defend the nation. It is inconceivable that the
United States Supreme Court would order the President and Congress
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to engage in unilateral disarmament. Even if the Court rendered such
an order, it is inconceivable that the President or Congress would obey
it.
What would happen if the United States entered into multilateral
agreements with other countries, whereby all undertook to eliminate
nuclear weapons - would the Supreme Court then order the President
and Congress to carry out the obligation of the United States to dis-
arm, and would the President or Congress obey any such court order?
Again, the answer must be negative. The Supreme Court is in no posi-
tion to monitor compliance, by other countries, with a multilateral
agreement to disarm, nor can the Court react effectively to any viola-
tion that may occur. The most that the Court could accomplish would
be to settle disputes as to whether an action taken or proposed by the
President or Congress was within the jurisdiction of that branch of gov-
ernment. But even here, the highly sensitive nature of the subject mat-
ter might discourage the Court from stepping in.
It seems, then, that the hypothetical constitutional amendment dis-
cussed above would not establish any enforceable law. It could, how-
ever, be seriously misunderstood by foreign governments, who might
interpret it as a signal that the United States was committed to dis-
armament whether or not other countries reciprocated. The security of
the United States would then be seriously endangered.
The hypothetical constitutional amendment would, of course, be a
powerful statement of public opinion, and the proceedings leading to its
ratification would provide a massive public forum for the debate on
nuclear weapons. But public opinion can be expressed very effectively
in many other ways, including the election of public officials, the con-
duct of polls, or the use of "1-900" telephone surveys at a cost of 50
cents per "vote." If the American people insist on an end to nuclear
weapons, they are quite capable of making their wishes known without
the need for an amendment to the Constitution or for a reinterpretation
of the existing constitutional language.
The preceding comments reflect my serious doubt that the adop-
tion of a constitutional amendment, or the reinterpretation of the ex-
isting constitution, could legally bind the United States government to
engage in nuclear disarmament. The constitutional arguments could be
ingredients of a public forum, but they would not be essential ingredi-
ents, and the debate could proceed on questions of national and inter-
national policy as effectively without as with the inclusion of the consti-
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tutional arguments. Indeed, the elimination of constitutional arguments
might speed up the debate, by preventing lengthy discussion or litiga-
tion about the jurisdiction of the courts, the standing of any potential
plaintiffs, or other technicalities.
This means that lawyers would not be able to contribute, to the
public debate, any specialized knowledge of legal rules or technicalities
pertaining to the subject matter. This does not mean, however, that
lawyers should drop out of the public debate. To the contrary, as public
citizens, lawyers have a special responsibility to address matters of pub-
lic concern, even when the matters cannot be resolved by resort to legal
rules or technicalities. Lawyers are equipped to understand the frame-
work of institutions, to engage in rational and persuasive discourse, to
sift and compare ideas, to offer and demand the presentation of facts,
to marshal the arguments from various perspectives, and to seek ac-
comodation of conflicting tendencies. Holding these skills in trust for
society, lawyers have the opportunity and obligation to use them, not
only when a legal rule or technicality is at issue, but more broadly,
whenever a matter of general social concern is ripe for debate.
In the latter situation, the lawyer does not authoritatively lay
down the law. Rather, as an articulate citizen, the lawyer participates
equally with other citizens in wrestling with a common problem.
The threat of nuclear weapons is horrendous. The burden on pub-
lic officials is staggering. The need for public debate is urgent. No
higher challenge or opportunity has faced lawyers as citizens.
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